Asylo Quickstart Guide

This guide demonstrates using Asylo to protect secret data from an attacker with root privileges.


What is an enclave?

On traditional systems, the Operating System (OS) kernel has unrestricted access to a machine’s hardware resources. The kernel typically exposes most of its access permissions to a root user without any restrictions. Additionally, a root user can extend or modify the kernel on a running system. As a result, if an attacker can execute code with root privileges, they can compromise every secret and bypass every security policy on the machine. For instance, if an attacker obtains root access on a machine that manages TLS keys, those keys may be compromised.

Enclaves are an emerging technology paradigm that changes this equation. An enclave is a special execution context where code can run protected from even the OS kernel, with the guarantee that even a user running with root privileges cannot extract the enclave’s secrets or compromise its integrity. Such protections are enabled through hardware isolation technologies such as Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone, or even through additional software layers such as a hypervisor. These technologies enable new forms of isolation beyond the usual kernel/user-space separation.

New security features are exciting for developers building secure applications, but in practice there is a big gap between having a raw capability and developing applications that leverage that capability. Building useful enclave applications requires tools to construct, load, and operate enclaves. Doing useful work in an enclave requires programming-language support and access to core platform libraries.

What is Asylo?

Asylo is an open source framework for developing enclave applications. It defines an abstract enclave model that can be mapped transparently onto a variety of enclave technologies (a.k.a., enclave backends). Asylo provides a software-development platform that supports a growing range of use cases. In a sense, the enclave backend can be viewed as a special-purpose embedded computer running inside a conventional machine, with Asylo providing the necessary runtime for that embedded computer.

Below, we walk through building a simple example enclave. The example demonstrates initializing an enclave, passing arguments to code running inside the enclave, encrypting those arguments inside the enclave, and returning the processed results. Even though this is a very simple example, it demonstrates the basic functionality provided by Asylo and the steps required to utilize that functionality.

Getting started with the example code

Run the following commands to grab our Docker container and download the example source code used in this guide. See our README for additional instructions on Docker usage.

docker pull
mkdir -p "${MY_PROJECT}"
wget -q -O - | \
    tar -zxv --directory "${MY_PROJECT}"

Note that you can set MY_PROJECT to any directory of your choice. This environment variable is later used in the instructions for building and running the enclave application in this example.

The example source code can be found in the Asylo SDK on GitHub.

Overall approach

In Asylo, an enclave runs in the context of a user-space application. However, for security and portability reasons, Asylo does not support direct interactions between the enclave code and the OS. Instead, all enclave-to-OS interactions must be mediated through code that runs outside the enclave. We refer to the code running outside the enclave as the untrusted application and the code running inside the enclave as the trusted application, or simply the enclave.

Here, we focus on a model where a majority of the user-developed logic lives inside the enclave. In this model, users may have to write some boiler-plate (similar to what is presented later in this guide), but most of the code needed for creating, launching, and interacting with enclaves is provided by the Asylo framework.

Asylo takes an object-oriented approach to enclave application development. Conceptually, an enclave is a collection of private data and private logic, along with public methods to access it. To this end, Asylo models an enclave using TrustedApplication, an abstract class that defines various enclave entry-points. To implement an enclave application, a developer creates a subclass of TrustedApplication and implements the appropriate methods.

Throughout this guide, we use both trusted application and enclave to refer to an instance of TrustedApplication.

Enclave interaction model

In Asylo, enclaves operate on protocol-buffer messages; all enclave inputs and outputs are protocol buffers.

We refer to the process of switching from an untrusted application to an enclave as entering the enclave and the process of switching from an enclave to an untrusted application as exiting an enclave.

In Asylo, all enclave interactions are handled through an abstract class called EnclaveClient. The Asylo framework provides concrete implementations of this class for each supported enclave technology. The EnclaveClient class defines several methods for entering an enclave. Enclave exits, on the other hand, are implicit—they either happen automatically when an enclave entry finishes its work, or they happen when an enclave requests services from the operating system.

Of the various enclave-entry methods defined by the EnclaveClient interface, three are of particular interest to Asylo users:

  • EnterAndInitialize: This method takes an EnclaveConfig message containing basic enclave configuration settings and passes it to the enclave. This is a private method, and is implicitly invoked by the Asylo framework when an enclave binary image is loaded.
  • EnterAndRun: This method takes an EnclaveInput message, passes it to the enclave, which can populate the EnclaveOutput result. The EnclaveInput and EnclaveOutput messages can be extended with protobuf extensions by the developer to meet the data-processing requirements of the application. This method is a public method, and may be called an arbitrary number of times with different inputs after the enclave is initialized.
  • EnterAndFinalize: This method takes an EnclaveFinal message, which may contain any information needed by the enclave for finalization, and passes that message to the enclave just before it is destroyed. This method is also a private method of the EnclaveClient class, and is implicitly invoked by the Asylo framework on enclave tear-down.

Each EnclaveClient is associated with exactly one enclave, and the Asylo framework forwards calls to the above EnclaveClient methods to appropriate enclave methods on the corresponding TrustedApplication instance, which can be overridden by the enclave developer.

The TrustedApplication interface declares methods corresponding to the three entry methods defined by the EnclaveClient abstract class:

  • Initialize: This method takes an EnclaveConfig message from EnclaveClient::EnterAndInitialize, and initializes the enclave with the configuration settings in the EnclaveConfig.
  • Run: This method takes an EnclaveInput message from EnclaveClient::EnterAndRun, populates an EnclaveOutput message, and performs trusted execution.
  • Finalize: This method takes an EnclaveFinal message from EnclaveClient::EnterAndFinalize, and prepares the enclave for destruction.

Enclave lifecycle

Entering an enclave is analogous to making a system call. The enclave entry point represents a gateway to protected code with access to the enclave’s resources. Arguments are copied into the enclave’s protected memory on entry and results are copied out on exit.

DEFINE_string(enclave_path, "", "Path to enclave binary image to load");
DEFINE_string(message, "", "Message to encrypt");

int main(int argc, char *argv[]) {
  google::ParseCommandLineFlags(&argc, &argv, /*remove_flags=*/true);

  LOG_IF(QFATAL, FLAGS_message.empty()) << "Empty --message flag";

  // Part 1: Initialization

  auto manager_result = asylo::EnclaveManager::Instance();
  LOG_IF(QFATAL, !manager_result.ok()) << "Could not obtain EnclaveManager";

  asylo::EnclaveManager *manager = manager_result.ValueOrDie();
  asylo::SimLoader loader(FLAGS_enclave_path, /*debug=*/true);
  asylo::Status status = manager->LoadEnclave("demo_enclave", loader);
  LOG_IF(QFATAL, !status.ok()) << "LoadEnclave failed with: " << status;

  // Part 2: Secure execution

  asylo::EnclaveClient *client = manager->GetClient("demo_enclave");
  asylo::EnclaveInput input;
  SetEnclaveUserMessage(&input, FLAGS_message);

  asylo::EnclaveOutput output;
  status = client->EnterAndRun(input, &output);
  LOG_IF(QFATAL, !status.ok()) << "EnterAndRun failed with: " << status;

  // Part 3: Finalization

  asylo::EnclaveFinal final_input;
  status = manager->DestroyEnclave(client, final_input);
  LOG_IF(QFATAL, !status.ok()) << "DestroyEnclave failed with: " << status;

  return 0;

The three enclave entry points are shown in the above code. Let’s go through each part of the code.

Part 1: Initialization

The untrusted application performs the following steps to initialize the trusted application:

  1. Configures an instance of EnclaveManager with default options. The EnclaveManager handles all enclave resources in an untrusted application.
  2. Configures a SimLoader object to fetch the enclave binary image from disk.
  3. Calls EnclaveManager::LoadEnclave to bind the enclave to the name "demo enclave". This call implicitly invokes the enclave’s Initialize method.

Part 2: Secure execution

The untrusted application performs the following steps to securely execute a workload in the trusted application:

  1. Gets a handle to the enclave via EnclaveManager::GetClient.
  2. Provides arbitrary input data in an EnclaveInput. This example uses a single string protobuf extension to the EnclaveInput message. This extension field is used to pass data to the enclave for encryption.
  3. Invokes the enclave by calling EnclaveClient::EnterAndRun. This method is the primary entry point used to dispatch messages to the enclave. It can be called an arbitrary number of times.
  4. Receives the result from the enclave in an EnclaveOutput. Developers can add protobuf extensions to the EnclaveOutput message to provide arbitrary output values from their enclave.

Part 3: Finalization

The untrusted application performs the following steps to finalize the trusted application:

  1. Provides arbitrary finalization data to the enclave and destroys the enclave via EnclaveManager::DestroyEnclave.
  2. Runs the enclave’s Finalize method. The Asylo framework performs this step implicitly during enclave destruction.

Writing an enclave application

We just saw how to initialize, run, and finalize an enclave using the Asylo framework. These calls happened on the untrusted side of the enclave boundary. Now, let us take a look at the code on the trusted side.

constexpr size_t kMaxMessageSize = 1 << 16;

// Dummy 128-bit AES key.
constexpr uint8_t kAesKey128[] = {0x00, 0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05,
                                  0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x10, 0x11,
                                  0x12, 0x13, 0x14, 0x15};

// Encrypts a message against `kAesKey128` and returns a 12-byte nonce followed
// by authenticated ciphertext, encoded as a hex string. `message` must be less
// than or equal to `kMaxMessageSize` in length.
const StatusOr<string> EncryptMessage(const string &message) {
  AesGcmSivCryptor cryptor(kMaxMessageSize, new AesGcmSivNonceGenerator());

  CleansingVector<uint8_t> key(kAesKey128, kAesKey128 + arraysize(kAesKey128));
  CleansingString additional_authenticated_data;
  CleansingString nonce;
  CleansingString ciphertext;

  Status status = cryptor.Seal(key, additional_authenticated_data, message,
                               &nonce, &ciphertext);
  if (!status.ok()) {
    return status;

  return absl::BytesToHexString(absl::StrCat(nonce, ciphertext));

class EnclaveDemo : public TrustedApplication {
  EnclaveDemo() = default;

  Status Run(const EnclaveInput &input, EnclaveOutput *output) {
    string user_message = GetEnclaveUserMessage(input);

    StatusOr<string> result = EncryptMessage(user_message);
    if (!result.ok()) {
      return result.status();

    std::cout << "Encrypted message:" << std::endl
              << result.ValueOrDie() << std::endl;

    return Status::OkStatus();

  const string GetEnclaveUserMessage(const EnclaveInput &input) {
    return input.GetExtension(guide::asylo::enclave_input_demo).value();

The above snippet defines a class EnclaveDemo, which derives from TrustedApplication, and implements the enclave’s secure execution logic in its Run method. This method encrypts the input message and prints the resulting ciphertext.

The TrustedApplication base class provides default implementations for the Initialize, Run, and Finalize methods. The enclave author is expected to override these methods as needed to implement their enclave’s logic. As demonstrated in this example, an enclave author typically would override the TrustedApplication::Run method to provide the core logic for their enclave, and use that method to interact with their enclave. Alternatively, the enclave author may launch an RPC server (e.g., a gRPC server) in the TrustedApplication::Initialize method, and then interact with their enclave via RPCs. In this case, the developer may choose not to override the TrustedApplication::Run method. The Asylo framework is flexible, and allows developers to use enclaves in a way that is most suitable to their needs.

Building and running an enclave application

To build our enclave application, we define several targets that utilize a simulated backend. See the overview for details on all supported backends.

    name = "demo_proto",
    srcs = ["demo.proto"],
    deps = ["@com_google_asylo//asylo:enclave_proto"],

    name = "demo_enclave",
    srcs = [""],
    deps = [

    name = "quickstart",
    srcs = [""],
    enclaves = {"enclave": ":demo_enclave"},
    loader_args = ["--enclave_path='{enclave}'"],
    deps = [

The Bazel BUILD file shown above defines our enclave’s logic in a sim_enclave called demo_enclave. This target contains our implementation of TrustedApplication and is linked against the Asylo runtime. We use a sim_enclave rule to generate an enclave that can be run in simulation mode.

The untrusted component is the target :quickstart, which contains code to handle the logic of initializing, running, and finalizing the enclave, as well as sending and receiving messages through the enclave boundary. In a non-enclave application, we would write :quickstart as a cc_binary target, but the enclave_loader rule streamlines the combination of driver and enclave targets. Specifically, it ensures that is compiled with the host crosstool, :demo_enclave is compiled with the enclave-backend-specific crosstool, and that the untrusted enclave loader is invoked with a flag that specifies the enclave’s path.

Let us now run the demo enclave inside the Docker image we downloaded above. You can set the --message flag passed to the //quickstart target to contain any string that you would like to encrypt.

Note: The following command runs the enclave in simulation mode.

docker run --rm \
    -v bazel-cache:/root/.cache/bazel \
    -v "${MY_PROJECT}":/opt/my-project \
    -w /opt/my-project \ \
    bazel run --config=enc-sim //quickstart -- --message="Asylo Rocks"
Encrypted message:

Congratulations on building and running your first enclave application!

Further exercises

Now you know enough about Asylo to begin modifying an enclave application. Here are some things to try:

  • Note that our current example does not make use of the output variable passed to EnterAndRun. Use SetEnclaveOutputMessage in, and GetEnclaveOutputMessage in, to return the encrypted message from the enclave to the driver, and print it there. The application output should remain unchanged.
  • The EnterAndRun function can be called multiple times once the enclave is initialized. Modify to add another call to EnterAndRun, in order to re-enter enclave with a different message to encrypt.
  • Use protobuf extensions in the EnclaveInput message to support sending ciphertext into the enclave for decryption, using the provided DecryptMessage function.

A sample solution is available on GitHub.