Real-World Applications in Enclaves

Enclavizing Redis and SQLite


Enclaves provide the powerful property that they’re protected and isolated from the system on which they run. This is very different from the traditional application model where the underlying operating system, et al., is implicitly trusted, and it opens up the door for exciting new types of systems.

Being isolated from the operating system and peripheral hardware (e.g., disk storage, network cards, etc), however, means that an enclave application doesn’t have direct access to the functionality that an operating system or special hardware would provide. While some applications wouldn’t require that kind of additional functionality, the vast majority do require it to varying degrees.

Asylo works to bridge this gap by providing the same POSIX interfaces to this functionality that applications would invoke on a non-enclave system. However, the Asylo versions of these interfaces work behind the scenes to interact with the untrusted operating system in ways that don’t trust it. This can involve encrypting data, tokenizing potentially sensitive values, or verifying that the operating system is not being malicious before using its responses.

One example of the POSIX support is signals. Many real-world applications register and handle signals for various purposes. The enclaves do not support signal handling. Signals are sent by the kernel to the host operating system. Asylo provides a secure signal handling system that allows incoming signals to enter and notify the enclave, which invokes handlers registered inside the enclave.

Another example is fork(). This is also widely used by real-world applications. For security reasons, enclaves are not cloneable. If fork() is called on the host operating system with a running enclave, the enclave will not exist in the new process (the address space for the enclave will simply be empty). Asylo provides secure fork() that safely encrypts a snapshot of the parent enclave and restores it in the child enclave.

As Asylo continues to add more and more POSIX interfaces in this manner, it becomes easier and easier to port applications to run in enclaves. This blog post discusses the technical details behind some interesting new additions (including signals and fork()) that significantly improve this. In fact, as of Asylo 0.4.0, one can run a wide variety of real-world applications (including Redis and SQLite) without even modifying any of their source code!

Technical Details

In recent months, several enhancements to the Asylo framework enabled the enclavization of non-trivial user applications such as Redis and SQLite. These enhancements include the addition of the cc_enclave_binary rule that enables wrapping of whole C++ applications as well as additional POSIX support. We briefly describe some of the highlights below.

Application wrapper

To make it easy to run an application in an enclave, Asylo now provides an application wrapper, which enables users to easily run an existing application in an enclave without any source code modifications.

Asylo now provides the cc_enclave_binary Bazel macro that allows users to wrap existing applications in an enclave. Users can simply put the existing application they want to run as a library in the deps field of this macro, and build/run it with Bazel. The binary will be linked in as a library, instead of being loaded at runtime. The application_enclave_config field can be used to pass a custom configuration into the enclave.

Every enclave application needs at least a small amount of non-enclave code called a “loader” that is launched by the OS. Asylo provides a stock loader that can launch the wrapped application inside an enclave. When running a cc_enclave_binary target, the application wrapper first runs its loader on the host side. The loader then loads the enclave and invokes its EnterAndRun method. The application wrapper’s loader passes the command-line arguments to the enclave in an EnclaveInput message. Inside the enclave, the corresponding Run method invokes the wrapped application’s main function with the provided command-line arguments. When main returns, Run places the return value from main in an EnclaveOutput message, which EnterAndRun returns to the loader. The application wrapper’s loader then returns this value as the exit code to the OS.

By doing this, the binary accepts input and provides output in the same way as the application normally would, but all of the original application is being run inside an enclave.

Asylo POSIX support

Asylo provides rich POSIX support for running applications such as Redis or SQLite inside an enclave. The goal of Asylo’s POSIX layer is to provide enclaves with functionality that is provided by a regular OS to non-enclave applications. Users writing code do not need to know their code is running inside an enclave, and should expect the same result from a syscall as if it were called from a regular application on a regular host.

Most syscalls are not security-sensitive. For these syscalls, Asylo exits the enclave and delegates the syscall to the host. For syscalls that may cause security issues if called directly by the OS, Asylo adds additional in-enclave processing that removes the need to trust the operating system while making use of the host OS’s syscall. For other syscalls, Asylo emulates the functionality of the syscall without exiting the enclave. Below are a few examples of how Asylo supports some security-sensitive syscalls inside an enclave.

Enclave Signals

Many applications, including Redis, register signal handlers for various purposes. Asylo provides signal-handling support for enclaves. Signals registered inside the enclave will be delivered into the enclave.

When a signal handler is registered inside an enclave, either through the sigaction or signal system calls, Asylo stores the enclave-specified signal handler inside the enclave as a function pointer. Asylo then exits the enclave and registers an untrusted signal handler on the host. When the OS delivers the corresponding signal to the loader application, it invokes the untrusted signal handler. This signal handler then invokes an enclave entry call to enter the enclave with all inputs of the signal handler (signum, info, ucontext). Once inside the enclave, Asylo looks up and invokes the enclave-side signal handler registered by the user.

When the signal mask is set from inside an enclave through sigprocmask, a signal mask stored inside the enclave is modified accordingly, and Asylo also exits the enclave to modify the signal mask on the host. Therefore, even if the host OS is malicious and the signal mask cannot be trusted, the enclave still prevents the handlers for masked signals from being invoked (The host OS can still block signals from being delivered into the enclave).

Enclave fork()

Redis, and many other applications, also invoke the fork() system call. Redis uses fork() for snapshotting its database state. Asylo provides support for the fork() system call.

For security reasons, enclave backends such as SGX do not allow an untrusted OS to clone an enclave. To enable running applications that make fork() calls inside an enclave without modification, Asylo provides fork() support with security features provided for such applications. Asylo fork() takes a snapshot of the enclave, creates a child process, loads a new enclave in the child, and restores that enclave from the snapshot. The Asylo fork() functionality provides the following security guarantees:

  1. Only the enclavized portion of the application can request a fork() of the enclave.
  2. The cloned enclave has exactly the same identity as the parent enclave.
  3. If no other threads were running inside the parent enclave when it called fork(), the cloned enclave’s state is the same as that of the parent enclave when it called fork(). Since the snapshot is currently not taken fully atomically, other threads running in the enclave may cause the state restored to the cloned enclave to not be fully consistent.
  4. The enclave state is only transferred to the clone in an encrypted form, with a randomly generated AES256-GCM-SIV encryption key.
  5. The parent securely transfers the snapshot encryption key to the child, and the child only restores its state from the parent’s encrypted snapshot. These properties are guaranteed by the fork() implementation via a one-time authenticated EC-based Diffie-Hellman key exchange between the two enclaves.
  6. At most one cloned enclave will be created per fork() request.
  7. If the encrypted snapshot is modified, the child enclave will not restore, and blocks all entries.

To accomplish #3, when the parent enclave requests a fork(), Asylo blocks any new entries into the enclave, sets an indicator that the parent enclave has requested a fork(), and exits the enclave. The untrusted Asylo runtime then enters the parent enclave using a special entry point to generate an encrypted snapshot of the mutable state of the parent enclave.

More POSIX support

Asylo is actively providing more POSIX support. Please check our website or Open Source Asylo for more updates.

Running Redis/SQLite With Asylo

Running Redis or SQLite inside an enclave with Asylo is straightforward. All that’s needed is:

  1. Import Asylo 0.4.0 and Redis 5.0.4/SQLite 3.28.0 in your WORKSPACE file.
  2. Copy the contents of Asylo “.bazelrc” for Bazel build configurations. It can be found from Asylo repository .bazelrc.
  3. Add a simple cc_enclave_binary BUILD target that wraps the application.

The fully detailed instructions to run Redis can be found at Run Redis Inside An Enclave.

The fully detailed instructions to run SQLite can be found at Run SQLite Inside An Enclave.